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Abstract—Business transactions by public firms are required to be reported, verified, and
audited periodically, which is traditionally a labor-intensive and time-consuming process. To
streamline this procedure, we design FutureAB (Future Auditing Blockchain) which aims to
automate the reporting and auditing process, thereby allowing auditors to focus on discretionary
accounts to better detect and prevent fraud. We demonstrate how distributed-ledger
technologies build investor trust and disrupt the auditing industry. Our multi-functional design
indicates that auditing firms can automate transaction verification without the need for a trusted
third party by collaborating and sharing their information while preserving data privacy
(commitment scheme) and security (immutability). We also explore how smart contracts and
wallets facilitate the computerization and implementation of our system on Ethereum. Finally,
performance evaluation reveals the efficacy and scalability of FutureAB in terms of both
encryption (0.012 seconds per transaction) and verification (0.001 seconds per transaction).
Introduction
Financial auditing is a systematic and inde-
pendent process of examining an organization’s
financial data, including books, accounts, statu-
tory records, documents, and vouchers to deter-
mine if they are accurate and compliant with
laws and regulations. Verification of counter-party
transactions is an essential part of auditing. Public
firms tend to be large, with a total global market
capitalization of $68.7 trillion. Auditing firms
handle large quantities of mechanical transac-
tion verification and have limited resources for
more sophisticated tasks that require discretionary
judgment and expertise. Due to the high cost
of verification, auditors usually randomize au-
dit samples. Consequently, traditional auditing is
necessarily partial with a considerable potential
for misreporting, which in turn erodes investors’
trust in public markets [1].
Moreover, auditing firms may possess mutu-
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ally useful information, yet prefer to work in-
dependently because (i) clients are reluctant to
authorize the sharing of data, which makes it
illegal for third parties to do so, especially after
regulations such as the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR); and (ii) traditional infras-
tructure does not have a mechanism to share data
in a cost-efficient way. In practice, when verify-
ing transactions, auditors contact the transaction
counter-parties either manually or through a third
party, which may not always be reliable [1]. Col-
laboration between auditing firms is challenging,
primarily due to the lack of a system that is
not only secure from hacking, but also scalable
and efficient in handling a large user base and
multitudinous transactions.
As a potential solution to these problems, in
this paper we present FutureAB, a blockchain-
based platform for collaborative auditing with
advanced privacy protections. Thanks to the de-
centralized nature of blockchain, FutureAB can
automate transaction auditing between firms with-
out the need for a trusted third party. To en-
sure the privacy of proprietary data, we have
adapted the Pedersen commitment to produce a
modified data exchange scheme for detailed trans-
fer of information along with the transactions.
FutureAB also employs a smart wallet system
and smart contracts to further improve efficiency.
We strengthen the protocol with ledgers to keep
track of records with immutability and ensure
informational security. Information stored on var-
ious ledgers makes it simple and easy to detect
manipulation attempts. Finally, we implement our
FutureAB system on Ethereum to evaluate its
performance. We find that FutureAB is scalable
and efficient, with an encryption speed of 0.012
seconds per transaction and verification at 0.001
seconds per transaction.
Our system answers the auditing industry’s
call for blockchain-based innovation. Although
all of the Big 4 auditing firms are aware of
the importance of blockchain and are devoting
vast resources to its development by establishing
research labs or providing blockchain services
(e.g., [2], [3]), it is still unclear how exactly this
emerging technology will affect the auditing in-
dustry and indeed the auditors themselves. While
accounting firms’ recent efforts center on building
in-house blockchain capabilities and services (e.g.
[2], [4]), our paper demonstrates the possibility of
connecting isolated auditing processes while pre-
serving data privacy with blockchain technology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
We review related literature, present the overall
design of FutureAB, and provide technical and
implementation details. We then perform compre-
hensive evaluations of the implemented system,
before concluding with a discussion of blockchain
applications in finance and accounting.
Related Work
Collaborative & Continuous Auditing
In auditing, collaboration is often identified
as a way to reduce costs and improve effi-
ciency. There are several existing applications
designed for collaborative auditing. Wu et al.
propose an agent-based architecture to increase
the frequency of periodic audits [5]. This scheme
emphasizes efficiency in continuous auditing, but
does not address privacy concerns. Sachar et al.
present a framework based on the concept of
an “audit warehouse” that enables central, tool-
supported auditing of cross-enterprise business
processes [6]. Chen et al. develop a collaborative
continuous-auditing model relying on XML and
Web Service technologies under service-oriented
architecture environments [7]. A complex protec-
tion profile is required to ensure data security
in these two frameworks. Wang et al. propose
a secure cloud storage system to support secure
public auditing and introduce a third party to
check the integrity of data [8]. However, the
integrity and reliability of the third party is not
guaranteed. Our blockchain architecture circum-
vents the aforementioned issues by implementing
a decentralized verification mechanism.
Smart Contract
Nick Szabo proposes “smart contracts,” com-
puter protocols that can automatically execute
the terms of a contract, facilitate and verify the
performance of a contract, interact with other
contracts, make decisions, store data, or send data
to others [9]. Many smart contract platforms are
now emerging, including Ethereum, Hyperledger,
and Corda. The FutureAB platform takes full
advantage of smart contracts to further minimize
human error and improve efficiency in auditing.
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Commitment Schemes
The Pedersen commitment is a commitment
scheme based on cryptographic hash functions
[10]. A commitment scheme allows the sender to
commit to a choice while hiding their selections
from other receivers. Commitment schemes are
widely used in blockchain applications to pre-
serve privacy. There are several examples of this
tactic in recent literature. For example, Knirsch
et al. propose using commitment schemes in
electronic vehicle charging [11]; Zhang et al.
propose BCPay, a blockchain-based fair payment
framework for outsourcing services in cloud com-
puting [12]; Xu et al. discuss the potential of com-
mitment schemes for enabling sharing economies
[13].)
FutureAB leverages the Pedersen commitment
with specific adjustments to guarantee informa-
tion security. Specifically, our proposed applica-
tion would ensure the suppression of auxiliary
information not directly related to transactions
in order to protect participants’ data privacy. For
example, if company A in Atlanta shipped 1,000
units to company B in Phoenix, which arrived
on 1/1/2020, the transaction record would contain
affiliated information that might be potentially
useful to competitors, such as date and type
of product. Our goal is to provide not only
a platform for the auditing process but also a
mechanism that would prevent the disclosure of
unnecessary information, which would provide an
incentive for inter-company auditor collaboration.
System Design
Pain Points of Current Auditing Processes
Traditionally, the auditing process of each
company is independent. Several issues arise:
High cost and low efficiency: Auditors of
one company have to request transaction records
from counter-parties and manually verify the in-
formation, which is a labor-intensive process.
Failure to fully utilize all information: Re-
ducing auditing sample size is a common way
to reduce costs. However, Cao et al. underscore
that the sample size correlates with the quality
of auditing [1], the failure of full information
utilization therefore negatively affects the end
result.
Fraudulent reports: Failure to use all infor-
mation in auditing also creates a greater poten-
Figure 1. Different roles in FutureAB.
tial for fraud or misreporting. Companies may
overstate earnings to boost their stock market
valuation.
Privacy and access: A platform for auditors
to share transaction information might reduce the
cost and improve the efficiency and quality of the
auditing process. However, companies are reluc-
tant to reveal proprietary information to others,
especially their competitors.
Business Process Design
FutureAB addresses the aforementioned chal-
lenges. The platform focuses on auditing
transaction-based accounts and, as shown in Fig-
ure 1, assists auditors in investigating mismatched
transactions, companies being audited, and reg-
ulators who oversee these processes. The whole
system is permission-based, meaning that permis-
sion could be granted by the committee of the
participants, such as the auditing association or
the Company Public Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB). The public key or address used within
the blockchain would still be limited to the mem-
bers of the system and would not be “public.”
All historical transactions are stored locally in the
auditor members’ proprietary databases.
Figure 2 displays the three major components
of FutureAB.
Private wallet: Under the proposed archi-
tecture, each company possesses a private elec-
tronic wallet, called ABWallet, which stores its
public addresses, private keys, and confidential
information for encryption within the system. We
next discuss how the wallet is generated, how
addresses and keys are managed, and how the
information is stored.
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Figure 3. Wallet initialization procedure.
Web-service: Auditors and regulators can ac-
cess a public web-based application to perform
tasks such as reviewing mismatched transactions.
Smart contracts are deployed here to pair posted
transactions for verification and then write veri-
fied transactions onto the blockchain.
Blockchain: Any key holder can use their
private key to sign the verified transactions.
The resulting signature is then recorded on the
blockchain for peers to verify.
The business process of FutureAB is as fol-
lows.
1) Initialize ABWallet for incoming compa-
nies. A company can join the system by request-
ing access via the website. Once the access is
granted, the incoming company can download
ABWallet, which generates, stores, and manages
public addresses, private keys, and commitment
secrets for further activities on FutureAB. The
organizations overseeing the auditing should be
the ones who monitor the blockchain system and
Figure 4. Post transaction procedure.
respond to the companies’ access requests. As
mentioned earlier, the PCAOB could be a good
candidate to maintain the auditing blockchain. An
alternative would be an alliance of major auditing
firms.
The wallet initialization procedure is pre-
sented in Figure 3. When companyx joins the
system, the company selects a set of other com-
panies they often work with. In response, AB-
Wallet generates distinct public addresses, private
keys, and commitment secrets for the selected
companies, sends public addresses and commit-
ment secrets to the corresponding companies,
and then requests addresses from the counter-
party, companyy. FutureAB provides a company
gallery, which sorts companies into different cat-
egories, such as a set of media companies, a set
of healthcare companies, and a set of retail com-
panies. The incoming company can pick several
sets as its potential counter-parties. This feature
enables the wallet initialization process to be
more efficiently achieved in small batches. When
posting transactions, ABWallet can automatically
generate addresses and request counter-parties
addresses if one of the counter-parties does not
yet exist in the wallet.
Once the addresses are received, value sets
(timestamp, addressxy, addressyx, secretxy,
keyxy) are stored privately in the wallet of
companyx. At the same time, companyy
also privately stores the value sets (timestamp,
addressyx, addressxy, secretxy, keyyx). We
use the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algo-
rithm (ECDSA) as our signature scheme.
2) Post transactions for verification. ABWallet
generates signatures and associated signed mes-
sages so that posting transactions on the web
service will not compromise digital security. The
4 Computer
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is from the sender; otherwise, the last digit of
the message is ‘1.’ Once the message is posted
successfully, the status of the message is labeled
as “pending,” which means that it is pending
verification.
Beyond basic information, companies are en-
couraged to post details of a transaction and hide
the information from the public with a Pedersen
commitment. If a discrepancy is spotted and au-
ditors are notified, the auditors can request the
commitments to be opened in order to review
the details of the transactions. The auditors can
also contact the corresponding companies if more
information is needed for investigation.
3) Verify posted transactions. Both counter-
parties should post the transaction and encrypted
messages with the same sender address, receiver
address, and commitment secret. If there are mul-
tiple transactions between two companies within
the same day (based on GMT), the FutureAB will
take the sum of these so that there is only one
transaction between two companies per day. The
web service consistently attempts to pair up two
messages. A pair is defined as two messages with
the same sender address, receiver address, and
date. As described above, the last digit should
be “0” or “1.”
There are three possible states of one posted
message as shown in Figure 5. Verified: If the
message is paired with another and two mes-
sages are identical except for their respective last
digits, the transaction in the message is verified
by both involved parties and can be written on
the blockchain as a permanent record. Risk: A
discrepancy is identified when a pair of messages
contain different amounts. We label the pair as
a “risk” to notify auditors to trigger an inves-
tigation. Being freed from mechanical transac-
tion verification, auditors can focus on discre-
tionary accounts where knowledge is indispens-
able. Pending: If only one involved party posts
the transactions, this asymmetry may produce
messages that cannot be paired.
Technical Details
ABWallet
We introduced ABWallet to allow each com-
pany to generate and manage value sets. AB-
Wallet is also responsible for communicating the
latest public addresses and commitment secrets
between companies in order to ensure the syn-
chronization of information. Whenever a com-
pany initiates the process of posting transactions,
ABWallet retrieves the latest value sets and en-
crypts the transactions.
A member joins the system by downloading
ABWallet and starting the wallet initialization
procedure discussed in the previous section. Ac-
cess to ABWallet should be kept private and se-
cure. The only information flowing among differ-
ent members’ wallets should be public addresses
and commitment secrets of counter-parties, and
the only information flowing from a wallet to the
web service should be signed messages.
For FutureAB, we propose using different ad-
dresses for transactions with different companies
in order to preserve anonymity. We also rec-
ommend frequently generating new addresses in
order to hide companies’ identities in the posted
transactions.
As shown in Figure 6, each wallet of the
corresponding company is a row. For instance,
Company A only has access to the first row in
the table. When Company B generates a new
value set for transactions with Company A and
updates the first cell in the second row, Company
A will be notified with new addressBA and
secretBA and a new value set will be appended
to the second cell in the first row. ABWallet helps
companies generate value sets and maintain up-
to-date information so that verification procedures
can be executed quickly and correctly.
April/May 2020 5
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Smart Contracts
Once smart contracts are compiled and mi-
grated, the web service can implement the smart
contracts when certain conditions are satisfied. In
our setup, the smart contract is triggered when
a new message is posted. It is executed to pair
messages and then write verified messages on the
blockchain.
Compared to a traditional auditing system,
smart contracts considerably reduce manual effort
and costs in verifying transactions because they
are code-based and run live on the Internet at a
low cost.
Commitment Schemes
In FutureAB, only two involved parties share
the secret to decrypt the message, meaning that
the message is hidden from all other parties on
the blockchain. In the meantime, both partici-
pating parties use the same secret to execute
a transaction which is then posted on the web
service, indicating that both parties can no longer
change what is committed. Note that FutureAB
can accommodate transactions involving multiple
parties.
This effort helps preserve the integrity of
the content without disclosure; when details are
inquired, the commitment could guarantee the
trustworthiness of the committed content. We
adapted the Pedersen commitment scheme in the
design of FutureAB. The Pedersen commitments
have the hiding property, which indicates that the
commitment reveals nothing about the message.
Additionally, Pedersen commitments are homo-
morphic, which facilitates the quick generation
and verification of transactions on FutureAB by
making it possible to combine commitments. If
cm1 and cm2 are two commitments to values v1
and v2, using commitment randomness r1 and r2,
then cm := cm1∗cm2 is a commitment to v1+v2
using randomness r1+r2. The commitment could
preserve the security of certain information re-
lated to the transactionsuch as transaction de-
scriptions, quantities of products, and exchanged
strategies, etc.to the highest extent, which would
encourage a larger number of participates to join
and collaborate on the system.
Implementation Details
Development Environment
The main components of FutureAB are AB-
Wallet, the web application, and the blockchain.
The Ethereum blockchain is a public blockchain
that allows users to perform Turing-complete
calculations (smart contracts). The Ethereum pro-
tocol has an average block time of 15s and
charges small transaction fees for the processing
of smart contracts. Ethereum satisfies all the cur-
rent requirements of FutureAB. The confirmation
time and other specific requirements of FutureAB
should be the subject of future research.
The web application interacts with smart con-
tracts on the Ethereum blockchain. The web app
is written in JavaScript and HTML5, using the
Truffle development framework. The framework
enables JavaScript bindings for the smart contract
6 Computer
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and includes libraries such as web3.js that facili-
tate communication between the web app and the
Ethereum client.
Rewards Program
FutureAB is designed to allow an optional
rewards programs implemented to attract more
companies and auditors. A rewards program can
be introduced to motivate every party in the
system to actively and continuously post their
transactions in order to achieve collaborative and
continuous auditing as an expected outcome of
FutureAB. The rewards program can also mo-
tivate companies to mine and sign the verified
transactions so that the records can be perma-
nently written on the blockchain.
Evaluation
To the best of our knowledge, FutureAB is
one of the first platforms that can support collab-
orative and continuous auditing on the blockchain
without compromising data privacy.
Once ABWallet is downloaded and initialized
for companyx, users from companyx can review
and manage partner companies addresses, keys,
and secrets via the list view in Figure 7. The con-
text menu on each row allows users to generate
new sets of values, to request new addresses from
their counter-parties, or to view the transaction
history. Users can also view transaction details in
the list view. The “Bulk add” button on the top
right of the screen allows users to upload multiple
transactions with an Excel sheet template. The
status of each transaction is indicated in the status
column.
We ran the simulation of wallet initializa-
tion and the transaction encryption on a 2.2
GHz Intel Core i7 machine with 16GB of RAM
and 1600 MHz CPUs. This hardware is only
used for simulation and performance evaluation.
Since FutureAB is a distributed blockchain, the
communication traffic and the resource usage
for each node are much lower than those on
a single machine simulation once deployed. It
takes 0.096 seconds on average to set up one
value set for one counter-party. It takes about 16
minutes to set up the wallet for a new company
when there are 10,000 selected counter-parties. It
takes 0.021 seconds on average to encrypt one
transaction. Less than 7 minutes are needed to
Figure 7. User interface design of ABWallet.
Figure 8. Time of transaction verification.
encrypt 20,000 transactions. As shown in Figure
8, the current system takes less than one minute
to verify 10,000 transactions. As such, we believe
that FutureAB can support real-time posting, i.e.,
companies encrypting and posting transactions
simultaneously with, or a short period of time
after, the occurrence of the events.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a blockchain archi-
tecture to automate collaborative and continuous
auditing and, in so doing, to build trust in public
markets.
Blockchain is one of the most influential
emerging technologies in the past decade. The
distributed nature of blockchains achieves
peer-to-peer communication and allows
April/May 2020 7
DR
AF
T
auditing collaboration and financial reporting
without relying on a trusted third party
(Decentralization). Blockchains naturally
provide immutability, which guarantees that
once an accounting activity is recorded, nobody,
including the owner of the business, can
arbitrarily change the records (Immutability).
Moreover, smart contracts use protocols and
algorithms to digitally and automatically
facilitate, verify, or perform a contract between
two parties within a blockchain (Automation).
The use of encryption techniques protects
proprietary information while ensuring certain
messages can be recorded on a public blockchain
without compromising privacy (Encryption).
Although blockchains with encryption boast
many exciting features, there are still several
limitations. The transaction verification needs to
pass a certain level of synchronization on the
whole peer-to-peer system, which may result in
a delay of seconds to minutes, not to mention
the extra storage required. Fortunately, the rapid
developments of hardware, consensus algorithms,
and storage technology mitigate these concerns,
especially for financial reporting and auditing
processes that do not require a millisecond-level
performance.
More generally, our proposed architecture
provides an alternative way to achieve privacy-
preserved information exchange. Besides audit-
ing, the system design could be applied to many
other fields for information collaboration, includ-
ing banking, insurance, and even healthcare.
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